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Abstract
Self-recognition in front of a mirror is used as an indicator of self-awareness. Along with humans, some chimpanzees and
orangutans have been shown to be self-aware using the mark test. Monkeys are conspicuously absent from this list because
they fail the mark test and show persistent signs of social responses to mirrors despite prolonged exposure, which has been
interpreted as evidence of a cognitive divide between hominoids and other species. In stark contrast with those reports, the
rhesus monkeys in this study, who had been prepared for electrophysiological recordings with a head implant, showed
consistent self-directed behaviors in front of the mirror and showed social responses that subsided quickly during the first
experimental session. The self-directed behaviors, which were performed in front of the mirror and did not take place in its
absence, included extensive observation of the implant and genital areas that cannot be observed directly without a mirror.
We hypothesize that the head implant, a most salient mark, prompted the monkeys to overcome gaze aversion inhibition or
lack of interest in order to look and examine themselves in front of the mirror. The results of this study demonstrate that
rhesus monkeys do recognize themselves in the mirror and, therefore, have some form of self-awareness. Accordingly,
instead of a cognitive divide, they support the notion of an evolutionary continuity of mental functions.
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Introduction
Mirror self-recognition, measured with the mark test [1], is
thought to be an indicator of self-awareness [2,3], the capacity to
comprehend that one exists as an individual separate from
thoughts, other individuals, and the environment. Some chim-
panzees [1] and orangutans [4], like humans [5], pass the mark
test and, therefore, are self-aware. Macaques, on the other hand,
are thought to lack self-awareness because, with few exceptions
[6], they have consistently failed the mark test and have shown
persistent social responses towards mirrors [1], even after
prolonged exposure [7] and training [8].
The mark test [1], the standard test for self-recognition, is
performed after first exposing an animal to the mirror, during
which time the behavior may change from social interactions
directed towards the reflection to self-directed behaviors [1],
indicating that it may have learned to recognize its reflection as its
own. The actual test consists of the application of marks on the
animal’s face while anesthetized, then exposure to a mirror after
recovery. If the animal touches the marks, acknowledging their
presence on its face, it is concluded that it has passed the test and
thereby verifies the observations that suggested that it recognizes
itself in the mirror [1] and, therefore, is self-aware [3].
Determining that an individual of a given species, an ape or a
monkey for instance, can recognize itself constitutes a monumental
problem because one cannot know objectively what is the
creature’s cognitive process; for a human, one cannot know what
he or she is thinking. The mark test is thought to provide an
objective solution to this problem. By touching the mark on its
face, not the mark on the mirror, the animal is thought to show not
only that it has detected the presence of the mark on its face but,
fundamentally, to have judged the mark as foreign to the image of
itself, demonstrating, therefore, that if has a concept of self.
The results of the mark test have been used to delineate a
fundamental divide in cognitive function between hominoids and
all other species [9,10], but recent evidence has called this
assertion into question. Some elephants [11], dolphins [12], and
magpies [13] have passed the mark test thereby demonstrating
that the ability to learn to recognize one’s self in a mirror has
evolved independently along different branches of the evolutionary
tree [13].
It is important to note that despite its objectivity and the fact
that it has become a benchmark, the mark test is not free from
controversy [14]. For instance, it may fail to properly measure the
cognitive abilities of species that do not self-groom or rely heavily
on senses other than vision [15]. Furthermore, it may share the
limitations of comparative studies of cognitive function that fail to
distinguish between differences in ability and differences in
performance [16–18]. It may be possible, therefore, that the
monkey has fallen on the wrong side of the cognitive divide.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12865Observations of two rhesus monkeys that had been prepared for
behavioral/electrophysiological studies with a head implant led us
to question the assertion that monkeys do not recognize themselves
in the mirror and, therefore, lack self-awareness. These monkeys
held mirrors and looked into them while grooming. The results of
two experiments with mirrors of different sizes, reflectivity, and
location confirmed our initial observations that indicate that these
animals do in fact recognize themselves in the mirror.
Results
Initial observations
Figure 1A,B shows a sample of the observations that led us to
question that rhesus monkeys cannot recognize themselves in the
mirror. Upon being returned to his cage after experiments this
monkey moved in front of the mirror (Fig. 1A), or held it at the
appropriate angle with one hand while grooming the area around
the implant with the other (Fig. 1B). The images in Movie S1
(supplemental materials) illustrate that the monkey engaged in
these behaviors for several minutes at a time. As reported in
chimpanzees during the mark test [1], the monkey smelled, licked,
and looked at his fingers while grooming in front of the mirror,
indicating that he understood that the area being groomed was
clearly his. Similar behaviors were observed in a second monkey.
Although they occasionally groomed the area around the implant
in the absence of the mirror, their gaze was not fixed in any
particular location. When grooming was guided by mirror
viewing, the monkeys always turned to face it and looked into it.
Furthermore, there were no attempts to touch or groom the image
in the mirror, which would have suggested that the monkey saw
the reflection as another animal. Most importantly, no social
responses were observed during the periods in which the monkeys
looked at themselves and groomed in front of the mirror.
Because these behaviors had not been reported in the literature,
these two monkeys were given the mark test and, consistent with
previous reports [1,7], they failed. In no instance did they show
behaviors directed at the marks dyed on their faces. Thus, we had
two conflicting pieces of evidence. On the one hand, both monkeys
failed the mark test, which as discussed above is the standard test
for self-recognition [1]. On the other hand, both monkeys
exhibited behaviors that were unequivocally self-directed and
guided by looking into the mirror (see Movie S1).
Since both monkeys had failed the mark test, it was imperative
to design experiments around other objective measures of
behavior that would allow us to determine if these monkeys
exhibited self-recognition. Anderson [19] outlined the following
criteria to objectively determine if an animal displays mirror self-
recognition: (1) the spontaneous development of mirror-guided
self-directed behaviors, such as examining parts of the body that
are unseen without the aid of a mirror, and (2) the disappearance
Figure 1. Examples of monkey self-directed behaviors in front of the mirror. (A,B) images from video recordings taken over the course of
approximately eight months following initial observations. In each photograph the hand used for grooming is highlighted with a red arrow. In (A) the
monkey leaned to his left while sitting on the perch to be able to look at himself in the mirror. In (B) The same monkey held the mirror at the
appropriate angle for viewing himself with the right hand while grooming the area around the implant with the left. (C,D) Self-directed behaviors
with the large mirror from two other monkeys. View of the implants have been masked for discretion (A–C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.g001
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included these measures were carried out to resolve the
contradiction.
Experiment 1
Although our initial observations appeared to demonstrate that
monkeys use the mirror to look at and groom themselves
spontaneously at any moment, the possibility existed that in
response to somatosensory stimulation from being cleaned, they
groomed the implant area regardless of the availability of the
mirror. Accordingly, the small mirrors were removed for one
week, then placed back on the cage of each of five subjects,
including the two animals initially observed using mirrors to
groom, for five one-hour sessions videotaped on separate days;
videotaping took place before cleaning the implant area to avoid
providing somatosensory cues. In addition, as a control, the
animals were also videotaped in five one-hour sessions using the
same mirror with the reflective surfaces covered with black plastic.
We hypothesized that no differences in behavior should be
observed if the reflectivity of the mirror was irrelevant and the
animal was simply holding or sitting in front of an object and
staring at it. Conversely, if important, the mirror should reveal self-
directed actions and reduction and eventual disappearance of
social responses [19].
On average, monkeys looked at the small mirror significantly
longer than the black control (p,0.05), approximately once every
2.5 minutes (Fig. 2A), but the duration of the looks, despite a trend
for being longer than the looks into the actual mirror, was not
significantly different (Fig. 2B). We hypothesize that the animals
persisted in looking at the black control because it was attached to
the same frame used to hold the regular mirror and stopped
looking when they realized that the object was not a mirror, as
revealed by the significantly larger number of looks directed at the
mirror versus the control (Fig. 2A).
Except for a few instances from one of the five subjects tested, no
social behaviors were observed with either the mirror or the control
(Table1).Inaddition,asdescribedbelow,some ofthemonkeysused
the small mirror to examine parts of the body they could not see
directly. We computed the rate in which they spontaneously
touched or groomed the area around the implant and other unseen
areas of the body (genitals) with and without the mirror. An equal
rate of touching would have indicated that the mirror was
irrelevant. The data in Figure 2C indicate otherwise. The rate of
touching when the mirror was present was nearly tenfold greater
than without the mirror. The data have been normalized because of
the small number of spontaneous touches in the control. These
observations are consistent with Anderson’s [19] assertions
regarding behavioral events that suggest self-recognition.
Figure 2. Quantification of mirror-directed behaviors. (A) Average number of looks in the mirror per minute recorded in the large and small
mirror sessions and their corresponding controls covered with black, non-reflective plastic. (B) Average look duration for the mirrors and black
controls. (C) Rate of touching unseen areas, the area around the implant on the head and genitals as described in B of Table 2, in the small and large
mirror sessions normalized to the control. Control represents the no-mirror condition. Data from all five monkeys studied are included in this figure.
All behaviors involved the monkeys moving or moving the mirror with their hands or feet to obtain the appropriate angle to look at themselves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.g002
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Despite the positive results of the previous experiment, the
possibility existed that the small size of the mirror coupled with it
being hung outside the cage may have mitigated the monkeys
perceiving the images in the mirror as threatening conspecifics and
thus made the observed behaviors possible. Accordingly, a large
mirror in which the monkeys could see their entire body was
introduced. This mirror had one reflective side, was hung in the
upper half of a double space cage, and could be swiveled. It was
reasoned that this arrangement would provide the monkeys room
to observe themselves, inspect the backside of the mirror, or avoid
it if threatened by the reflection.
The introduction of the large mirror was met with curiosity.
Figure 1C,D shows two monkeys as they held the large mirror with
their hands and feet while looking at themselves (see also Movie
S2). The first interactions were varied and included looking behind
the mirror, presumably seeking the monkey they observed in the
reflection. The contingency with the mirror was quickly
established, however, and social behaviors subsided during the
first session.
Monkeys looked at themselves more than twice as often in the
large than in the small mirror (Fig. 2A), possibly due to the novelty
associated with it. This measure comprises all instances of actively
looking in the mirror without social behaviors, listed under the Self-
examination heading in Table 2. Specifically those in which the
monkey turned toward the mirror, positioned it at the appropriate
angle to look into it, or shifted its position to match the moving
mirror in order to maintain the appropriate angle of view. In
control sessions the average number of looks was smaller (p,0.05)
than with the mirror; there were no differences in the number of
looks between the controls of the two experiments (Fig. 2A).
Interestingly, in control sessions two monkeys tore the cover
exposing part of the mirror and looked into it intently.
The number of looks into the mirror was significantly larger
than the control during the first thirty minutes (p,0.05), declining
slightly in the second half of the session (Fig. 3A). Throughout the
first session the number of looks declined for the mirror and the
control; the number of looks at the control was practically zero
after 30 min. Few or no interactions were documented with the
control in sessions 2–5. The monkeys appeared to simply ignore
the black, non-reflective object.
One of the most important findings concerns the difference in
the rate of occurrence of self-directed and social behaviors directed
towards the large mirror (Fig. 3B). Social behaviors occurred at a
lower rate (p,0.05) than self-directed behaviors. Fundamentally,
unlike in previous reports in monkeys [1], their rate decayed
significantly from the first to the second session (p,0.05),
remaining at negligible levels in the subsequent three. This is
similar to observations in chimpanzees [1,20] and consistent with
one of Anderson’s [19] assertions that diminishing and ultimately
extinguishing social behaviors are indicative of self-recognition
during mirror tests. Lastly, the monkeys looked into the large
mirror approximately once a minute, a rate that decreased slightly
across all five sessions but the decline did not reach significance.
The duration of the looks directed at the large mirror and its
control were similar to the duration of the looks directed at the
small mirror and control in Experiment 1 but, despite a trend for
longer looks into the mirrors, the differences did not reach
significance (Fig. 2B).




Mean 0.490 0.064 0.201 0.004 0.106 0.030 0.021
SE 0.115 0.033 0.049 0.002 0.066 0.007 0.011
Large Black
Mean 0.029 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.020
SE 0.018 - 0.014 - 0.003 - 0.009
Small Mirror
Mean 0.160 0.061 0.058 0.003 0.028 0.002 0.000
SE 0.042 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.000
Small Black
Mean 0.046 0.007 0.043 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.015
SE 0.013 0.005 0.012 - 0.003 - 0.007
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.t001
Table 2. Behavioral categories and descriptions.
Behavior Description
Self-examination
A) Looking at himself in mirror Specific orienting or positioning of his body in front of mirror and intent self-
examination
B) Looking at himself in mirror while touching otherwise unseen areas Specific orienting in front of mirror and grooming implant area or examining genitals
C) Looking at himself in mirror while holding it Grabbing the mirror and specifically orienting it to self-examine
D) Looking at himself in mirror while touching otherwise unseen areas
and holding it
Holding mirror in position while intently looking at reflection and grooming implant
area or manipulating genitals
Exploratory
E) Using mirror to look at environment (as a tool) Angling the mirror to indirectly examine areas of the environment or neighboring
conspecifics
G) Looking behind the mirror Examining space behind or around mirror
Social
F) Behaviors observed when an animal comes into contact with an
unknown conspecific
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their genitals (Fig. 4). This behavior was first observed after the
head implant of one monkey was removed to avert a potential
infection, after which he continued to use the small mirror but
instead of observing and grooming the top of his head, he began
inspecting and touching his genitals (see Movie S3); the implant
was reattached later successfully. All five monkeys used the mirror
to look at areas of their bodies they could not see directly.
Sometimes they used one hand to hold the mirror in place (Fig. 4B)
and moved or manipulated their genitals (Fig. 4B,C), while other
times they performed acrobatics in what appear to be an effort to
obtain a better view (Fig. 4D and Movies S4, S5). These
observations are consistent with another of Anderson’s [19]
assertions concerning mirror-guided behaviors that are indicative
of self-recognition and could be categorized under Povinelli et al.’s
[20] classification of self-exploratory behavior used as a positive
Figure 3. Quantification of mirror-directed behaviors during the first session and across five sessions. (A) Number of looks in the large
mirror and large black-covered mirror during the first session. The one-hour session was broken up into 10-minute bins. (B) Number of looks into the
large mirror and number of social behaviors directed at the large mirror per minute. The number of social behaviors in the last four sessions declined
significantly (p,0.05) relative to the first. The standard bars represent standard errors and the asterisks indicate significance (t-test, p,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.g003
Figure 4. Example of monkeys examining their genital area in front of the mirrors. The red arrows point to the manipulation of the
genitals (B,C). (D) Acrobatics such as this were commonly observed during inspection of genital area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.g004
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Figure 2C, the rate of looking at unseen areas, the genitals in
particular, was ten times smaller in the absence of the mirror.
Notably monkeys that had not been implanted were not
observed using the mirror suggesting that the implant constituted a
relevant stimulus, a ‘‘super mark,’’ that prompted them to look.
We confirmed this by observing the behavior of two monkeys the
day after the implant was attached. After some hesitation both
monkeys began to look at themselves in the mirror and to examine
the area around the implant. Unequivocally more revealing was
that they attempted to pull the head post off their heads while
looking in the mirror, a behavior that subsided after a few attempts
and was not observed again. Most importantly, these behaviors
were mirror-guided and self-directed but never directed toward
the reflection in the mirror.
Discussion
Here we have shown that rhesus monkeys, though failing the
mark test, demonstrate behaviors indicative of mirror self-
recognition. They use the mirror to groom their head implants
and inspect unseen areas of their bodies such as their genitals.
Though we cannot objectively claim that these animals are self-
aware, all the pieces are there to suggest that, in some form, they
are.
If the ability to demonstrate self-recognition were innate, as
suggested by Gallup [7], and could be explained solely on
evolutionary grounds, one would expect that most, if not all
members of a given species would or would not pass the test [21].
As it turns out, only a fraction of chimpanzees shows signs of
mirror self-recognition [20,21]. Furthermore, one would not
expect a phylogenetic gap in the expression of this ability, a
conclusion derived from the fact that gorillas fail to show signs of
mirror self recognition and fail the mark test [20], while
orangutans, though lower evolutionarily, do [22]; but see [23,24]
for positive evidence from two different gorillas. Note: even in
children the proportion that exhibit self-recognition at a particular
point in development varies as a function of intelligence level,
cultural background, and type of self-recognition test administered
[25–27].
A more likely explanation, however, is that behaviors indicative
of mirror self-recognition are learned by establishing a contingency
between self-produced movement and the reflection. The
capability to learn and establish such a contingency and the form
in which it is expressed is likely to vary across species. The question
arises, therefore, as to the conditions that facilitate the establish-
ment of the contingency.
Overall, the data are consistent with the saliency hypothesis
[16], which postulates that an alteration in an individual’s body
must be highly salient to draw attention to the mirror image.
Accordingly, the changes imposed on the appearance of monkeys
in the standard mark test, as with more extensive markings in
cotton-top tamarins [28], are not sufficient to draw the animal to
touch the marks while looking in the mirror. The head implant, on
the other hand, constitutes a relevant change that motivates the
subject to use the mirror to inspect the area around it.
The sudden onset of self-directed behaviors in front of the
mirror suggests that the monkeys either developed this ability de
novo as a result of the surgery or were aware that they could see
themselves in the mirror but were unable, perhaps due to gaze
aversion, or uninterested in looking at themselves until a
sufficiently relevant change took place - implantation of the head
cap, therefore, simply triggered the display of this ability. Based on
the length of the exposure to mirrors of these monkeys before they
received the implants (all grew up with mirrors and were exposed
to them constantly throughout their lives as part of their
enrichment program), we conclude that the data are consistent
with the latter.
We hypothesize that for the monkeys in this study the implant
constituted a ‘‘super mark’’ that, coupled to their prior experience
with the small mirror, the mobility of both mirrors, and the
monkey’s direct access to them, facilitated the manifestation of
these behaviors. Future study should reveal what are the most
effective experimental conditions, including mirror configurations
and the time required to develop the contingency.
The mark test [1], therefore, is an inadequate measure of self-
recognition for rhesus monkeys. A similar argument can be made
for the results of studies of other species that rely heavily on audition
or olfaction, as the mark test relies solely on vision, because they
mayrevealsome formofself-recognitioniftested differently[15,29].
More fundamentally, the mark test may not be enough to reveal
that members of a given species are self-aware [14].
These observations, taken together, demonstrate that rhesus
monkeys do recognize themselves in the mirror and, therefore,
have the fundamental elements to have the capacity to be self-
aware. Accordingly, we conclude that behavioral differences
between hominoids and lower primates are not the result of
cognitive deficits in the latter, but rather of a different position on
the underlying evolutionary continuity of mental functions
[6,15,30].
Materials and Methods
Five male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 5–13 years of age
that had been exposed to mirrors as part of their enrichment
throughout most of their lives were studied. A sixth monkey, who
had also received a head implant, showed no interactions with the
mirror and thus was not included in the study. The mirror was
two-sided, set in a plastic frame measuring 364.75 inches, hung
outside the cage, and could be swiveled. All five subjects had been
prepared for behavioral/electrophysiological experiments with a
head implant, the area around which was cleaned before
experiments with a dry cotton swab. The implant consisted of a
block of acrylic (Ortho Resin, Justi Products, Oxnard, CA) ranging
in size ,(40 mm–100 mm640–80 mm). The acrylic was blue in
color and held (1) a lightweight titanium head post used for
holding a water spout in front of the animal’s lips during head-
unrestrained oculomotor experiments and to restrain the head to
clean and care for the area surrounding the implant [31], (2)
connectors for the eye coils [32] used to record eye movements
with the scleral search coil technique [33], and (3) a cylinder to
insert microelectrodes into the brain for physiological recordings.
Two implants, one with and one without a recording cylinder are
shown in Figure S1. The implants were attached to the skull of the
subjects with human grade titanium screws.
The animals were housed individually and provided double the
space, 12.4 cu ft, typically provided for rhesus monkeys. Data were
acquired in the room where the animals were housed. Video
recordings followed the initial observations using a webcam
without humans present. The animals continued to participate in
their assigned experiments. Five one-hour sessions were video-
taped for the two mirror sizes, small and large (12624 inches set in
a metal frame), and corresponding controls in which the mirrors
were covered with black non-reflective plastic. The non-reflective
controls were used to determine if similar behaviors took place
when the monkeys could not see themselves.
The data were scored offlinefor self-directed and social behaviors
infrontofthemirroraccordingtothecategoriesoutlinedinTable2.
Monkey Self-Recognition
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either positioned the mirror with his hand to look at himself or
moved to attain the appropriate angle for viewing himself. These
are similar to the criteria used to characterize the behavior of
chimpanzees [20]. Of particular importance were self-exploration,
defined as manipulation of areas not visible without use of the
mirror (e.g., the anal-genital area) used to classify animals as
showing positive evidence of self-recognition, and social behaviors,
aggressive or appeasing gestures suggesting that the monkey sees a
conspecific [20]. Three observers, aware of the hypothesis being
tested, viewed and scored the first group of data collected according
to the behavioral categories listed in Table 2. The formula used by
Povinelli et al. [20] was used to calculate reliability where the
percentage of agreement between observers = total instances of
agreement/total opportunities for agreement with L.C. Populin
used as the standard for comparison. A congruency between the
scoring of three observers exceeded 95% in the first group of video
data obtained thus only one observer scored the remaining data.
The small proportion of inconsistencies among the three observers
primarily comprised the length of brief behaviors such as glances
into the mirror; they were resolved by consensus after frame-by-
frame review of the pertinent sections of the video record. All efforts
were made to ameliorate suffering of the animals. Specifically, all
procedures were approved by the University of Wisconsin Animal
Care Committee and were in accordance with the National
Institutes of Health Guide for the Care and User of Laboratory Animals.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Head implants. (A) Basic head implant used for
behavioral experiments. The acrylic holds a titanium head post
and two connectors for eye coils. (B) Head implant used for
physiological experiments. A recording cylinder, 19 mm in
diameter, has been added to the basic implant to allow the
insertion of microelectrodes.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s001 (1.35 MB TIF)
Movie S1 Self-directed behavior in front of the mirror. This
movie shows a monkey waking up from a nap, then reaching for
the small mirror outside his cage, positioning it to view himself,
and grooming the area around the implant while looking at
himself. A green mark used for the mark test, which he failed, is
still visible on his left cheek. The view of the head implant has been
blocked for discretion.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s002 (0.33 MB
MOV)
Movie S2 Typical use of the large mirror by monkeys. This
movie shows a monkey using the large mirror inside his cage to
view his neighbor and to examine himself. Note the position of his
right leg, which is elevated thereby exposing his genital area. For
nearly one minute the monkey observes himself without signs of
social behaviors directed at the mirror.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s003 (1.10 MB
MOV)
Movie S3 This movie shows a monkey inspecting the lower part
of his body and genitals using the small mirror. He looks over his
shoulder to view his backside and genitals. Note that toward the
end of the movie he reaches with his hand between his legs and
pushes his genitals forward into view, confirming, therefore, that
he is examining them in the mirror. This movie was recorded after
the implant had been removed from this monkey.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s004 (1.12 MB
MOV)
Movie S4 Use of the big mirror to inspect genitals; two clips are
shown in succession. First the monkey positions the mirror, orients
and lifts his left, then grabs his genitals while looking attentively.
Second, the monkey directly looks between his legs, then turns
toward the mirror to view the same part of his body.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s005 (0.89 MB
MOV)
Movie S5 Monkey performing acrobatics in front of the mirror
to view his backside and genitals. First the monkey looks between
his legs while pushing his genitals with his hand. Second, he hangs
upside down from the top of his cage while attempting to view his
genital area from this angle.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012865.s006 (3.12 MB
MOV)
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